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COUSIN v. SUNDQUIST
145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998)
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In drafting section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, Congress ensured that no
"state or political subdivision" can employ
voting practices that abridge "the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color."' In Cousin v.
McWherter, eight African-American
voters in Hamilton County, Tennessee
alleged their voting rights had been
abridged in violation of this Act.2
Specifically, the voters claimed that the
judicial elections for the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit of Tennessee and the Court of
General Sessions of Hamilton County
violated section 2 because the elections
resulted in dilution of the voting strength
of African-Americans in Hamilton
County.3 The voters sought injunctive and
declaratory relief against the State
Election Commission, the Coordinator of
Elections, the Hamilton County Elections
Commission, and the Registrar at Large of
Hamilton County.4
At the time of the initial filing,5 the
voters challenged the practice of at-large,

circuit wide elections of the nine judges
for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit and three
6
judges for the Court of General Sessions.
In these elections, the at-large voting
procedures allowed each candidate to run
for a specifically designated position.
Within each race, the candidate with the
highest number of votes won.8 Although
this case has been heard twice by the
United States District Court for the
Eastern District ofTennessee and twice by
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, the lower court initially held
that the use of the at-large district diluted
the effectiveness of minority voters in the
county.9 The lower court relied on the
Senate Report accompanying the 1982
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act to
guide its analysis of the voters' claims.10
The Senate Report identified "the nature
of section 2 violations and the proof
required to establish these violations."" l
In addition, the report also indicated
"typical factors" that might be probative of
In
a section 2 violation.1 2
6

Cousin v. McWherter, 840 F. Supp. at 1211.

7 Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d at 820.
Sld.

Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973
1998).
(West
2 Cousin v. McWherter, 840 F. Supp. 1210, 1211
1 Voting

(E.D. Tenn. 1994).
3Id.

41d.
' At the time of the most recent ruling by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, the Tennessee legislature had increased the
number of Hamilton County General Sessions
judges from three to five. Cousin v. Sundquist,
145 F.3d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1998).

9 840 F. Supp. at 1221.
10Id. at 1212-20.
"Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,43 (1986).
12 The Senate Judiciary Committee majority
Report accompanying the 1982 amendments
states:
Section 2 protects the right of
minority voters to be free from
electionpractices, procedures or
methods, that deny them the
same opportunity to participate
in the political process as other

citizens enjoy.
If as a result of the challenged
practice or structure plaintiffs
do not have an equal
opportunity to participate in the
political processes and to elect
candidates of their choice, there
is a violation of this section. To
establish a violation, plaintiffs
could show a variety of factors,
depending upon the kind of
rule, practice, or procedure
called into question.
typical factors include:
1. The extent of any history of
official discrimination in the
state or Political subdivision
that touched the right of the
members of the minority group
to register, to vote, or otherwise
to participate in the democratic
process;
2. The extent to which voting
in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially
polarized;
3. The extent to which the
state orpolitical subdivision has
used unusually large election
districts, majority vote
requirements, anti-single shot
provisions, or other voting
practices orprocedures thatmay
enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the
minority group;
4. If there is a candidate
slating process, whether the
members of the minority group
have been denied access to that
process;
5. The extent to which
members of the minority group
in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of
discrimination in such areas as
education, employment and
health, which hinder their
ability to participate effectively

weighing these "typical factors," the lower
court found evidentiary support for five of
the seven factors and that, under a totality
of circumstances analysis, the dilution
outweighed any compelling state
interest. 3
Defendants' appeal to the Sixth

in the political process;
6.
Whether political
campaigns have been
characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals;
7. The extent to which
members of the minority group
have been elected to public
office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some
cases have had probative value
as part of plaintiffs' evidence to
establish a violation are:
whether there is a significant
lack of responsiveness on the
part of elected officials to the
particularized needs of the
members of the minority group.
whether the policy underlying
the state or political
subdivisions use of such voting
qualification, prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous.
While these enumerated factors
will often be the most relevant
ones, in some cases other
factors will be indicative of the
alleged dilution.
The cases demonstrate, and the
committee intends that there is
no requirement that any
particular number of factors be
proved, or that a majority of
thempoint one way or the other.
S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29
(1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 206, 207.
13 Cousin v. McWherter, 840 F. Supp. 1210,
1213 (E.D. Tenn. 1994).

Circuit resulted in remand to the lower
court. 4 The court of appeals required the
lower court to articulate more specific
bases for its findings and to correct its
analysis ofplaintiffs' burden. 5 According
to the court of appeals, to prove a section
2 claim a plaintiff must first satisfy three
preconditions before a "totality of
circumstances" analysis is employed. 6
These three preconditions, as established
by the United States Supreme Court in
Thornburg v. Gingles,'7 require that a
plaintiff establish that the minority group
is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to comprise a majority in a
single-member district; that the minority
group is politically cohesive; and that the
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc
to usually defeat the minority's preferred
candidate. 8 The appeals court also found
error in the district court's analysis of
Tennessee's interest in linking the
judiciary's electorate and jurisdiction. 9
After concluding that states may have a
substantial interest in the efficacy
advanced when the jurisdictional and
electoral bases of a court system are
linked,2" the court of appeals ordered the
lower court to weigh Tennessee's linkage
interest as a separate factor in the "totality
of circumstances" test.2

On remand, the district court found
the presence of all three preconditions, as
well as five of the seven factors
announced by the Senate.22 Although the
district court found that as a matter of law
the state's linkage interest was a
substantial state interest, it did not
overcome the section 2 violations found
by the court.23
HOLDING
The Sixth Circuit determined that
plaintiffs did not satisfy the third Gingles
precondition that the white majority votes
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it usually
to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate.24 The court stated that this
singular holding mandated reversal.2 The
court also found further reversible error in
the lower court's application of the
"totality of circumstances" test.26 Under a
de novo review of the totality of
circumstances test, the court found that
only one Senate factor-the effects of past
discrimination on African-Americans'
political participation-bolstered the claim
of vote dilution and that this factor failed
Cousin v. McWherter, 904 F. Supp. 686, 688,
691, 704-13 (E.D. Tenn. 1995).
21 Id. at 712.
22

Cousin v. McWherter, 46 F.3d 568, 569 (6th
Cir. 1995).
1 Id. at 577.

24 Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818, 834 (6th
Cir. 1998).
25 To provide future guidance, the court suggested
that the remedies of single member districting and

16Id. at

cumulative voting'were unsuitable to remedy a

4

17 478

574.

U.S. 30 (1986).

violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. In

" Cousin v. McWherter, 46 F.3d at 574 (citing

addition, the court also limited Voting Rights Act

Thomburgv. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,50-51 (1986)).
'9 Cousin v. McWherter, 46 F.3d at 577.
20 Cousinv. Mc Wherter, 46 F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir.
1995) (citing League ofUnited Latin Am. Citizens
v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993)).
21 Cousin v. McWherter, 46 F.3d at 577.

claims to those of an impairment of a minority's
ability to determine an election. The court stated
it would refuse to permit claims of impairment of
a minority's ability to influence the outcome of an
election. Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d at 834.
26

id.

to outweigh the State of Tennessee's
legitimate and substantial linkage
interest.2 7 Consequently, the court of
appeals reversed the holding that minority
plaintiffs were denied equal access to the
political process and vacated the remedial
order of cumulative voting.28
ANALYSIS
The Sixth Circuit has twice held
that plaintiffs must satisfy three
preconditions to meet their initial burden
of production. 9 In its analysis of the
preconditions, the court reviewed these
mixed questions of law and fact for clear
error.3" Although the court has demanded
a showing of the three Gingles
preconditions, plaintiffs needed to
demonstrate only two of the preconditions. The defendants conceded the
existence of the second precondition of a
sufficiently politically cohesive minority
group. 31 In its analysis of the third precondition, this court found that plaintiffs
had failed to show that the white majority
vote sufficiently as a bloc to enable it
usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate.32 In light ofplaintiffs' failure to
produce evidence to support the third
precondition, the court found it
unnecessary to analyze the first
precondition that the minority group was
sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a

27 id.
28 id.
29

Cousin v. McWherter,46 F.3d at 575; Cousin v.

Sundquist, 145 F.3d at 823.
30 Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d at
823.
31 id.
32
1Id. at 826.

single member district. 33
In reviewing evidence regarding
the presence of the third precondition, the
court reexamined plaintiffs' and
defendants' expert testimony as well as
tabular data on racial bloc voting. 4 In
finding that the white majority votes in a
manner usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate, the district court had
relied on testimony from plaintiffs' expert,
Dr. Cole, and tabular data of Chattanooga
city elections.35 In his analysis of
Tennessee elections pitting a white
candidate against an African-American
candidate, Dr. Cole tabulated the
percentage of whites voting for a white
candidate and the percentage of AfricanAmericans voting for an AfricanAmerican candidate.36
Dr. Cole
suggested that his tabulations
demonstrated the racial cohesion of an
election and used these tabulations to
determine the amount of white crossover
votes an African-American candidate
would need to win an election. Based on
the crossover calculations, Dr. Cole
concluded that an African-American
candidate generally would lose a county

33

1d. at

34

1d. at

823.
826.

35 The tabular data the district court relied upon
was gathered for Brown v. Board of
Commissioners of Chattanooga,Tennessee, 722

F. Supp. 380 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (The tabular data
separated the percentages of the white and
African-American vote for each candidate by
deeming each election either "Racially Polarized"
or "Not Racially Polarized" in Chattanooga City
Commission elections from 1971-1987,
Chattanooga judge contests from 1969-1987, and
other elections and referenda from 1970-1988).
36 Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d at 823-24.

wide election in Hamilton County.37
When the court of appeals
compared the study of defendants' expert,
Dr. Taebel, with Dr. Cole's study, the
court found that Dr. Taebel's study
utilized a more germane methodology.38
In his study, Dr. Taebel included not only
Tennessee elections where opposing
candidates were African-American and
white, but he also included elections
where both candidates were white. 39 Dr.
Taebel's data supported the conclusion
that minority preferred candidates enjoyed
success in many Tennessee elections.40
Based on his research, Dr. Taebel
concluded that the majority did not vote in
such a way as to deprive the AfricanAmerican voters of Hamilton County of
the opportunity to elect their preferred
candidate. 4' The court of appeals found
Dr. Taebel's study more relevant because
it asked whether minority preferred
candidates, whatever their race, usually
lose, not whether white candidates usually
defeated African-American candidates.42
In taking the view that reflected "the
potentiality that the minority's preferred
candidate might be a white person," this
court found Dr. Taebels' conclusions to be
supported by his study, whereas, the court
found Dr. Cole's conclusions unsupported
by his study.43
Additionally, the court found that
the district court improperly relied on data
from a previous case challenging
17 Id. at
38

Chattanooga city elections.' This data
was from nonpartisan city wide elections
to a legislative body, and not relevant to
the instant case of partisan countywide
elections to the judiciary because it
provided no basis for finding that the
white majority usually voted in a manner
to defeat the minority preferred
candidate.45 Using the success of minority
preferred candidates, as opposed to only
African-American candidates, as the
standard for weighing the third
precondition and Dr. Taebel's study which
concluded that minority preferred
candidates can and do win county wide
Hamilton County elections, the court of
appeals found that plaintiffs did not meet
their burden regarding the third
precondition.
Although the court of appeals
clearly held that plaintiffs had not
established a viable voting rights claim
because they failed to meet their burden of
production, the court examined the
proposed remedial plans of single member
districting and cumulative voting to
provide guidance for future voting rights
claims.46
In its discussion of the
impropriety of single member district
plans, the court of appeals viewed the
single member districts as "at odds with
the important state interest of 'linkage."'47
The court emphasized that linkage
allowed judges to serve the entire
constituency from which they were
elected as well as ensured judges could be
held accountable via election by the entire

824.

Id. at 825.

39

Id. at 824-25.

40 Id. at 824.
41 id.

44 Id. at 826.
45
Id.

Id. at 825.

46

Id. at 826-31.

43 Id. at 825-26.

47

Id. at 827.

42

constituency.48 In weighing Tennessee's
interest in linkage for legitimacy and
substantiality, the court also reasoned that
in this case linkage was not instituted or
sustained to dilute minority voting
strength.

49

Additionally, the court of appeals
found.the "impairment of the minority's
ability to influence the outcome of the
election, rather than to determine it" was
an underlying premise of the single
member districting proposal.5 The court
found error in the district court's
assumption that an "influence claim"
would be actionable under the Voting
Rights Act.51 The court of appeals did not
agree with the district court's
interpretation of the legislative history of
the influence claim. 2 Specifically, the
court of appeals considered neither the
language of the Senate Report
accompanying the 1982 amendments to
the Voting Rights Act,53 nor a footnote in
the Gingles opinion5 4 to be substantial
48 Id. at 827-28.
49 Id.
50
51

Id. at 828.
Id.

52

Id.

53 The district court noted "that the Senate Report

as previously cited herein expressly directs an
inquiry into whether or not the totality of
circumstances indicates that the voting strength of
minority voters has been 'minimized or cancelled
out.' This is clearly inclusive of an influence
claim such as plaintiffs have alleged in this case."
Cousin v. McWherter, 904 F. Supp. at 713.
54
Footnote 12 in Thornburgv. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30, 46 (1986), states:
The claim we address in this
opinion is one in which the
plaintiffs alleged and attempted
to prove that their ability to

evidence for allowing an "influence
claim."55 The district court relied on the
Senate's concern over whether minority
voting strength had been "minimized or
canceled out" and the failure to include a
requirement of minority geographic
compactness, later included in the inquiry
by the Gingles court. 6 The district court
noted a Gingles footnote that did not

elect the representatives of their
choice was impaired by the
selection of a multimember
electoral structure. We have no
occasion to consider whether §
2 permits, and if it does, what
standards should pertain to, a
claim brought by a minority
group, that is not sufficiently
large and compact to constitute
a majority in a single-member
district, alleging that the use of
a multimember district impairs
its ability to influence elections.
We note also that we have no
occasion to consider whether
the standards we apply to
respondents' claim that
multimember districts operate to
dilute the vote of geographically
cohesive minority groups, that
are large enough to constitute
majorities in single-member
districts and that are contained
within the boundaries of the
challenged multimember
districts, are fully pertinent to
other sorts of vote dilution
claims, such as a claim alleging
that the splitting of a large and
geographically cohesive
minority between two or more
multimember or single-member
districts resulted in the dilution
of the minority vote.
5 Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d at 828.
56 Cousin v. McWherter, 904 F. Supp. at 713.

preclude an influence claim.5 7
Unpersuaded by the reasoning of the
lower court, the court of appeals
interpreted the Gingles footnote as
limiting the use of influence claims.5 8 The
court of appeals also looked to another
Supreme Court opinion for support.59
This court found that when presented with
factual circumstances ripe for deciding the
issue of an influence claim, the Supreme
Court failed to assert that an influence
claim was permissible.60 Based on the
lack of positive legislative history
allowing a claim of an impairment of a
minority's inability to influence an
election as actionable, the court of appeals
found plaintiffs' influence claims
inactionable under the Voting Rights
Act. 6'
The court of appeals viewed the
proposed cumulative voting scheme as an
inappropriate solution for a section 2
voting rights claim.62 The court found that
cumulative voting would achieve
"proportional representation" and viewed
it as "an end not contemplated in the
Voting Rights Act." S Furthermore, the
court foresaw cumulative voting as
potentially undermining judicial
57 Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d at 828-29.
58

Id. at 828.

59

Id. (citing Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146,

158 (1993)).
Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d at 828.

60

61 Id. at

62

828-29.
Id. at 829.

63id.

Section 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act
states: "Provided, that nothing in this
section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the
population." 42 U.S.C. § 1973.

collegiality, independence, and quality.64
Like the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit, this court viewed
cumulative voting as encouraging racial
bloc voting and "the very practices and
stereotypes the Equal Protection Clause is
set against."6
The court also cited
concerns related to "organized interest
groups seizing control of a fraction of the
state judiciary"6 6 and a "fear that
cumulative voting is a step in the
evolution of the current strategy of
creating majority-minority districts to
produce proportional results."67 In light
of these concerns, the court found
cumulative voting totally unsuitable to
remedy voting rights claims. 8
The court of appeals also reviewed
the "totality of circumstances" test of the
Senate factors.69 In a de novo weighing of
the seven factors,70 the court found that
only the effects of past discrimination on
political participation was dispositive to
the claim of minority vote dilution.7 The
court did not alter the district court's
finding of African-American economic

64 Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d at 830.
65 Id. (quoting Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d

1494,

1546 (llth Cir. 1994)).
66 Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d at 830 (quoting
Mary Thrower Wickam, Note, Mapping the
Morass: Application of Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act to JudicialElections,33 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1251, 1284 (1992)).
67 Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d at 831.
68
Id.at 829.
69
The court changes from a clear error standard
of review to a de novo review because the court

is reviewing the application of the totality of
circumstances test that involves a mixed question
of law and fact. Id. at 831-32.
70
Senate Report, supranote 11.
71 Id. at 831-33.

and political isolation within Hamilton
County.72 However, the court did not find
that any of the other six factors
substantially supported the vote dilution
claim.73 The court also looked at the
supplemental factors ofthe responsiveness
of elected judges to the needs of the
minority voters as well as Tennessee's
linkage interest.74 The court found that the
judges had been responsive and that the
state linkage interest was still legitimate
and substantial.75 Although the court
reiterated that the preconditions had not
been satisfied and thus no violation had
been established, the court showed that
plaintiffs' claims would not have passed a
"totality of the circumstances" test.76
CONCLUSION
When this court strictly applied the
Gingles factors as the burden of
production for all section 2 plaintiffs, two
effects followed. First, the court of
appeals encumbered the ability of future
voting rights plaintiffs to bring voting
rights suits. Second, the court foreclosed
any possible claim of an "inability to
influence an election."
In requiring voters with Voting
Rights Act claims to satisfy the threepronged Gingles burden of production
before even addressing the totality of
circumstances test, the onus on plaintiffs
has increased dramatically. The preconditions as the burden ofproduction are
arguably more difficult to satisfy than the
Senate factors under a totality of the
7

2 Id. at 833.

13

circumstances test.
The totality of
circumstances test provides flexibility to
the trier of fact. This flexibility, as echoed
in the Senate Report when it stated that
"no requirement that any particular
number of factors be proved, or that a
majority of them point one way or the
other,"7' 7 gave wide latitude to plaintiffs in

It is
presentation of their case.
foreseeable that the burden structure
imposed here may be heavy enough to
deter voting rights claims under section 2.
The potential chilling effect is very
ironic in light of the purpose behind the
1982 Voting Rights Act Amendments.
The amendments were drafted as a
response to the Supreme Court's
requirement that a discriminatory intent be
proven before a voting rights violation
could be found. The congressional intent
behind the amendments was to lighten the
burden of proof for plaintiffs trying to
prove violations under the Voting Rights
Act. The amendments instituted a results
oriented test where plaintiffs needed only
to show that the effect of vote dilution was
affecting their ability to determine the
The strict
outcome of an election.
application of the Gingles preconditions
has reversed the intended effects of 1982
amendments of a lighter burden for voting
rights plaintiffs.
Secondly, the strict application of
the Ginglespreconditions as the burden of
production for all plaintiffs claiming
violations under section 2 necessarily
forecloses the claim of an inability to
influence an election ceases to be a viable
claim. The first precondition states that a

Id. at 831-33.

74 Id. at 833-34.

Id. at 833.
"
76
Id. at 834.

77 S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted

in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 206, 207.

minority must be sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single member district. In
requiring the ability to attain a majorityminority district as a precondition for
establishing a violation, the court has
foreclosed any possibility of a claim by a
small minority group who wants only to
influence an election.
The strict
application of the first precondition also
forecloses the possibility that any small
minority will be able to make a voting
rights claim. The idea that the size of a
minority affects its ability to protect the
votes of its citizens does not seem to
comport with the spirit of the Voting
Rights Act or the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Gingles, the preconditions
articulated by the court were clearly meant
to apply to all "ability to elect" claims.
However, in reserving judgment on the
viability of an influence claim in Gingles,
Voinovich, and Degrandy, the Supreme
Court has failed three times to eliminate
the option of an influence claim. The
Court has left the influence claim as an
option. In Gingles, the Supreme Court
applied the preconditions only to an
ability to elect claim. It is a distinct
possibility that the Gingles preconditions
do not govern ability to influence claims,
but only ability to elect claims.
The language of section 2 also
indicates the viability of an ability to
influence claim. The section allows
violations to include abridgement of the

right to vote in "political processes leading
to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision."
Political
participation encompasses far more than
voting in an election. If this section is to
fulfill its mission of protecting the
political process, it must protect not only
the right to vote, but also protect the
ability to foster coalitions. Interracial
coalitions fostered by their ability to
influence an election may help maintain
the linkage interest the court of appeals
found so significant.
Additionally,
allowing influence claims further protects
larger minorities. Frequently, minorities
are "packed" into a district where they are
guaranteed a minority-preferred candidate.
The minority may lose the ability to
influence and participate fully in the
election if their votes are unnecessarily
"wasted" on the minority-preferred
candidate in the majority-minority
district.
It is entirely possible that
applying the Ginglespreconditions rigidly
to all section 2 voting rights claims
threatens to jeopardize the flexibility
carefully written into the Act,
unnecessarily over-burden plaintiffs
making voting rights claims, and eliminate
the ability of small minorities to protect
their voting rights.
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